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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-2276 
___________ 
 
GLORIA J. STEZZI, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CITIZENS BANK OF PA; TALX 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:10-cv-04333) 
District Judge:  Honorable Thomas N. O’Neill, Jr. 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 1, 2013 
Before:  JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 7, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Gloria Stezzi, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s orders granting 
Citizens Bank’s (hereinafter, “the Bank”) motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
41(b) and denying her motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).  For the following 
reasons, we will affirm. 
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I. 
 Stezzi’s appeal has a lengthy procedural history.  In August 2010, she filed a 
complaint alleging that her former employer, the Bank, had engaged in employment 
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-5.  After denying the Bank’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, the District 
Court scheduled a pretrial conference for November 8, 2012.  However, this conference 
was cancelled after Stezzi filed several motions for summary judgment, and the District 
Court directed the parties to conduct discovery.  Despite this direction, proceedings 
stalled. 
 In an attempt to move the case along, the District Court scheduled a pretrial 
conference for February 5, 2013, to discuss discovery matters.  Stezzi then asked the 
District Court to cancel the conference and order the Bank to respond to her motions for 
summary judgment because, she argued, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 “does not require discovery 
for a motion for summary judgment.”  The District Court declined to cancel the 
conference and ordered Stezzi to appear for her deposition on February 19, 2013. 
 On February 19, Stezzi appeared but did not participate in her deposition.  Instead, 
she presented the Bank’s counsel with a new motion for summary judgment before 
leaving the courthouse.  As a result, the District Court ordered Stezzi to appear on 
February 22, 2013, to show cause why her case should not be dismissed for failure to 
follow its order.  A day before the hearing, Stezzi filed a response asking the District 
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Court to vacate its show cause order and direct the Bank to respond to her new motion for 
summary judgment.  Stezzi did not appear for the show cause hearing. 
 In response to Stezzi’s request, the Bank filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 41(b) and a request for costs.  Despite being ordered to respond, Stezzi filed 
several motions, including another motion for summary judgment.  The District Court 
conducted an analysis under Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 867-68 
(3d Cir. 1984), and granted the Bank’s motion.  Stezzi subsequently filed a motion 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), which the District Court denied.
1
  This appeal followed. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District 
Court’s dismissal of Stezzi’s case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) for abuse of discretion 
only.  Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002).  Rule 41(b) dismissals 
are “drastic” and “‘extreme’” measures that should be reserved for cases where there has 
been “‘flagrant bad faith’ on the part of the plaintiffs.”  Poulis, 747 F.2d at 867, 868 
(quoting Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976)). 
III. 
 Stezzi’s opening brief asserts that: (1) the District Court violated Rules 16 and 26 
by allowing the Bank to disregard scheduling orders; (2) the District Court violated Rule 
                                              
1
 Stezzi does not challenge the denial of Rule 60(b) relief on appeal, and we deem that 
issue waived.  See Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours, 372 F.3d 193, 202-03 (3d Cir. 
2004). 
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56 by allowing the Bank the opportunity to obtain discovery pertinent to her motions for 
summary judgment; and (3) the District Court erred under Rules 37 and 41 when it 
dismissed her case.  We understand the last of these arguments to question the propriety 
and fairness of the District Court’s dismissal pursuant to Poulis.  See Haines v. Kerner, 
404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).  We therefore turn first to our review of that dismissal. 
Under Poulis, courts must balance six factors to determine whether dismissal 
under Rule 41(b) is warranted: “(1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) 
the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and 
respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or 
the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than 
dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness 
of the claim or defense.”  Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868.  No single factor is determinative and 
not all must be satisfied to justify dismissal.  See Hicks v. Feeney, 850 F.2d 152, 156 (3d 
Cir. 1998). 
We agree with the District Court that the first factor, which focuses on the extent 
of Stezzi’s personal responsibility, weighed against Stezzi because, as a pro se litigant, 
she was “solely responsible for the progress of h[er] case.”  Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 
252, 258-59 (3d Cir. 2008).  The second factor, which focuses on prejudice to the 
adversary, also weighed against Stezzi.  Her failure to attend her deposition and disregard 
for the District Court’s orders frustrated the progress of discovery and the Bank’s ability 
to prepare a defense.  See Ware v. Rodale Press Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003).  
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Likewise, the third and fourth factors also weighed against Stezzi because she 
consistently and willfully refused to participate in discovery, comply with the District 
Court’s orders, and otherwise move her case forward.  However, the sixth factor, which 
focuses on the meritoriousness of the claims, may have weighed in favor of Stezzi given 
that her claims survived the Bank’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
As to the fifth Poulis factor, which focuses on the availability and effectiveness of 
alternative sanctions, Stezzi argues that the District Court should have required the Bank 
to file a Rule 37 motion rather than a Rule 41(b) motion.  If a party fails to attend her 
own deposition, the opposing party may file a motion for sanctions along with a 
certification that it has attempted to “confer with the party failing to act in an effort to 
obtain the . . . response without court action.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(1)(B).  However, as 
noted above, the District Court had already acted by ordering Stezzi to attend her 
deposition.  Stezzi has not provided any case law indicating that a party is required to file 
a Rule 37 motion to compel rather than a Rule 41(b) motion to dismiss, and our research 
has not uncovered any.  In any event, the District Court did not commit reversible error 
when it concluded that no alternative sanctions, including sanctions under Rule 37,
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would have been effective against the continually recalcitrant Stezzi.  Accordingly, 
considering that nearly all of the Poulis factors clearly weighed against her, we cannot 
conclude that the District Court abused its discretion in dismissing Stezzi’s case.  Simply 
                                              
2
 Even if the Bank had filed a Rule 37 motion, dismissal of Stezzi’s action remained a 
viable sanction.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v), (d)(3). 
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put,  her dilatory behavior and refusal to comply with court orders over the course of 
years of litigation left the District Court with little choice. 
Stezzi also argues that the District Court erred by allowing the Bank to obtain 
discovery relating to her motions for summary judgment and that the District Court 
violated Rules 16 and 26 by allowing the Bank to default on scheduling orders.  The 
scope and conduct of discovery are matters left to the sound discretion of the district 
courts.  See Pub. Loan Co. v. FDIC, 803 F.2d 82, 86 (3d Cir. 1986).  Certainly, the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the Bank the opportunity to gather 
evidence to determine whether summary judgment was warranted.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(d)(2).  Furthermore, Stezzi’s claim that the Bank refused to engage in discovery is 
belied by the record, as the Bank did submit a proposed discovery schedule in 
compliance with the District Court’s orders.3  Accordingly, the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion regarding the discovery process. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  We grant 
in part Stezzi’s unopposed motion to amend the District Court record to the extent it 
seeks to supplement the record with undocketed letters, with service to Stezzi, from the 
Bank to the District Court.  We grant the Bank’s motion to file a supplemental appendix. 
                                              
3
 Stezzi also argues that the Bank violated discovery orders by filing a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings rather than a proposed discovery schedule.  However, the 
District Court granted the Bank leave to file this motion, and the Bank was well within its 
rights to file such a motion before discovery began. 
